

Public health considerations for mpox in EU/EEA

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AIDS Action Europe Webinar on Mpox, 12 May 20223



No conflicts of interest to declare

Outline



- Epidemiology
- Vaccination
- Risk communication and community engagement
- Conclusions

Global figures and trends on the mpox outbreak, 11 May 2023



87,377


Confirmed cases

140

Deaths

111


Countries reporting cases



Source: WHO: https://worldhealthorg.shinyapps.io/mpx_global/#section-fns2

European region, mpox situation update, 04 May 2023






25,887 cases of mpox reported from 45 countries as of 04 May 2023

Spain (7 551), France (4 146), Germany (3 676), Netherlands (1 264), Italy (957), Portugal (949)

European region, mpox situation update, 04 May

2023

- 29 EU/EEA countries with at least one case since the beginning
 - 10 countries reported at least one case the past 3 months



France (total 4 146 cases)



Cluster in Centre Val del Loire


- 1 Jan-3 April 2023: 19 cases (16 since 1 March)
- 24-56 years old; 18/19 MSM; no hospitalizations; no links to common event

10 cases (53%) vaccinated:

- 7 not vaccinated
- 2 incomplete vaccination
 - 1: 1 dose in childhood
 - 1: 1 dose in 2022
- 10 reported a complete vaccination schedule
 - 4: 1 dose in childhood + 1 dose in 2022
 - 6: 2 doses in 2022

Age and gender distribution of mpox cases, European region





98% of cases among male


39% of cases among those aged 31-40



HIV status of reported mpox cases in Europe (n=10,651)




Sexual Orientation	Count (%)			
MSM	10,831 (42.8%)			
Bisexual	131 (0.5%)			
Heterosexual	335 (1.3%)			
Unknown or undetermined	2,723 (10.8%)			
Not reported	11,261 (44.5%)			
Total	25,281 (100%)			



Distribution of symptoms (n=16 061) in the European Region




The median time between symptom onset and diagnosis was 7 days



^{*}Fever, fatigue, muscle pain, chills, headache

Timeline of Public Health response on mpox in EU/EEA





1st RRA
"Mpox multicountry
outbreak"

Declaration of the Public Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC)

Public health considerations for mpox in EU/EEA countries



JUNE 8th

JUNE 29TH APRIL 14

MAY 11

2022



UKHSA reported 2 confirmed Cases (family cluster)



Portugal reported 3 confirmed cases and 15 suspected cases



MAY 23rd

2st update of the RRA "Mpox multicountry outbreak"

MAY 30th



ECDC-WHO
Europe—
Joint bulletin
on mpox
situation

2023



Fifth Meeting of the International Health Regulations (2005) (IHR) Emergency Committee on the Multi-Country Outbreak of mpox (monkeypox)




Mpox is no longer considered a PHEIC

- Significant decline in the number of reported cases compared to the previous reporting period and no changes in the severity and clinical manifestation of the disease.
- There are **remaining uncertainties about the disease**, regarding modes of transmission in some countries, poor quality of some reported data, and continued lack of effective countermeasures in the African countries, where mpox occurs regularly.
- These are long-term challenges that would be better addressed through sustained efforts in a transition towards a long-term strategy to manage the public health risks posed by mpox, rather than the emergency measures inherent to a public health emergency of international concern (PHEIC).

Public health considerations for mpox in EU/EEA countries




- Vaccination
- Surveillance
- Testing
- Contact tracing and partner notification
- Infection prevention and control
- Risk communication and community engagement





Vaccination



Vaccination strategy



Primary preventive (pre-exposure) vaccination (PPV)

PPV refers to the vaccination of groups of individuals at high risk of exposure to MPXV infection.

The level of risk of infection may differ between these

The level of risk of infection may differ between these groups, is linked to the specific epidemiological situation



- → recent history of multiple sexual, attending sex on premises venues
- → chemsex practices
- → use of or eligibility for PrEP for HIV
- → recent history of STI
- Sex workers
- Occupational exposure (HCW)
- Severe disease (children, pregnant women, immunosuppressed individuals)

Two doses are required for optimal protection and can be given 28 days apart. The mpox vaccine takes approximately 14 days before it is effective.





Post-exposure vaccination (PEPV)

PEPV refers to the immunisation against MPXV of close contacts of cases to prevent the onset of disease or mitigate disease severity.

Such strategy depends on the possibility to identify contacts of cases through contact tracing.

- Close contacts of cases
 - → sexual partners,
 - → household contacts,
 - → healthcare workers,
 - → and individuals with other prolonged physical or high-risk contact
- In the context of limited supply, contacts with a high risk of developing severe disease if infected should be prioritised (children, pregnant women, and immunocompromised individuals)



PEPV should be administered within four days of first exposure (and up to 14 days after exposure in the absence of symptoms)

Vaccination strategies



Vaccination strategies was collected from a rapid desk review of official sources (27 March to 3 February 2023)

Table A1. Countries with vaccination strategies (n=24)

Vaccination strategy	Countries
Primary (pre-exposure) preventive vaccination (PPV) and Post-exposure vaccination (PEPV)	Austria, Belgium, Croatia, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden
Primary (pre-exposure) preventive vaccination (PPV)	Italy, Liechtenstein
Post-exposure vaccination (PEPV)	Cyprus, Estonia, Latvia, Malta

Sources: ECDC survey responses, HSC survey responses and rapid desk review of official sources.

Vaccination doses administered

ecoc

Table A3. Number of doses administered by country by month (n=29)*, data as of 3 March 2023

Country	Year/Month 2022 2023									
									23	Total
	June	July	Aug	Sept	Oct	Nov	Dec	Jan	Feb	
Austria				1 150		1 286				2 436
Belgium			1 565	1 292	861	2 069	1 121	790		7 698
Croatia				4	121	175	72			372
Cyprus			10	4	2		1			17
Czechia						90	80	109	78	357
Denmark	30	104	2 804	5 072	822	289				9 121
Estonia				5	4	0	0			9
Finland				5	1 065	50	800	250		2 170
France	787	14 133	66 029	39 521	18 881	6 442	2 892			148 685
Germany	115	9 090	12 257	10 064	10 155	10 079	5 845			57 60
Hungary					106	183	105			394
Iceland		40	0	215	119	160	39	25		598
Ireland	4	28	83	363	844	1 294	2 239	2 802		7 657
Italy			3 808	10 356	7 473	3 090	1 082			25 809
Latvia				10			91			101
Liechtenstein							5	6	4	15
Luxembourg			384	684	178	55	19			1 320
Malta			1	1	0	0	0			
Netherlands		785	14 292	9 638	3 101	1 408	526	39	3	29 792
Norway			8	18	94	356	494	604		1 57
Poland									261	26:
Portugal		81	298	293	569	903	747			2 891
Slovenia				100	186	150	46	27		509
Spain			6 376	14 549	5 046	4 929	2 126			33 020
Sweden		9	50	715	1752	1411	620			4 55
Total	936	24 270	107 965	94 059	51 379	34 419	18 950	4 652	346	336 970

Notes: Bulgaria, Greece, Lithuania, and Slovakia have not started the mpox vaccination.

Poland: The doses reported in December are cumulative data and include all doses administered since October 2022,

^{---:} The vaccination campaign has not started.

^{*}Detailed country-specific information:

Czechia: Data for February 2023 are not complete.

Latvia: The doses reported in December 2022 are cumulative data and include doses administered in September, October, and December 2022.

Vaccine effectiveness studies 1/2



Refer	епсе	Country	Study population	Incidence/ Vaccine effectiveness			
[16,17	jurisdictions) eligible for vaccination MVA-BN vaccination was 9.6 times as high as the		Mpox incidence among males aged 18-49 years eligible MVA-BN vaccination was 9.6 times as high as that amount accinated males compared with those who had recompared with the properties of the properties who had recompared with the properties who had recompared w	among			
<u>Payne</u>	Payne Oct 2			two vaccine doses and 7.4 times as high as that among who had received only the first dose.			
<u>Payne</u>		E	ffectiveness at reducin	g the risk of mpox disease	on routes		
[18]	1 doco > 700/ [OF0/ CT F4 000/]) who ind 32		
<u>Hazra</u>	There is not difference between subcutaneous and intradermal administration routes						
[20]							
<u>Farrar</u>				one Jynneos vaccine dose ≥14 days before illness onset than among unvaccinated patients.			
[21] MMWR		disease, with two doses providing the best pro-		The vaccine was effective at reducing the risk of mpox disease, with two doses providing the best protection of VE= 69%, (95% CI=48-81%) regardless of how the value was administered.	ection adjusted		
[22] Bertrar			Vaccine effectiveness of 78% (95% CI=54-89%) after dose of MVA-BN vaccine.	I=54-89%) after a single			

Ongoing studies



- SEMVAc: EMA coordinating study on mpox in German clinics
 - Multi-center, prospective, observational cohort

- USMVAc:
 - Observational cohort using large healthcare data sources

Vaccination recommendations



- Individual level vaccination should not replace other protective measures
 - Those vaccinated should continue to avoid close contact with people who have mpox
- The limited evidence available indicates that the vaccine provides protection against MPXV.
- Infection can still appear after one vaccine dose, but illness appears less clinically severe, and hospitalisations are reduced
- The evidence indicates that two doses provide the highest vaccine effectiveness and therefore vaccination with two doses should be considered for all eligible individuals.
- Considering limitations in vaccine supply, PPV and PEPV strategies may be combined focusing on individuals at substantially higher risk of exposure and close contacts of cases, respectively.



Risk communication and community engagement



Principles of RCCE in Outbreak Response I



10 Risk Communication Principles

1.Identify **target groups** relevant to the mpox outbreak in Europe.

Raise a level of concern proportionate to the risk of different population groups.

Tailor risk communication through **channels** that target group(s) use (1).

Identify
spokespersons who
the affected population
groups trust.

Explain the **science** simply, to foster trust and acceptance.

Acknowledge uncertainty, by labelling public health advice as preliminary.

Recognize **people's fatigue** for restrictions as a barrier to their compliance with health advice.

Package messages and health advice relevant to **specific settings and circumstances**.

Provide public health advice **specific to the mpox outbreak**.

Use **pictures** of mpox symptoms to increase understanding, but not generate fear.

Principles of RCCE in Outbreak Response II



RCCE is nothing without working with communities!

- Actively engaging CSOs, community groups and leaders to
- gather and use community insights, knowledge, and perceptions to design interventions alongside communities;
- engage at-risk groups on how they can reduce their risk of exposure and act in case they suspect mpox and/or have symptoms;
- engage organizers of mass gatherings to share accurate, practical and targeted information to participants.

Challenges of RCCE Context



The features of the mpoxoutbreak in Europe contribute to a complex RCCE context:

- Predominantly affected group As most cases reported in MSM, increase risk of stigmatization.
- Uncertainty Unknown aspects of the disease in early stage of the outbreak, currently evidence related with vaccination. Need to communicate uncertainty
- Mass gatherings Festivals and events including festivals and Pride events where large numbers of people will gather
- Stigmatization & health seeking behaviour

RCCE guidance at their use





Interim advice on Risk Communication and Community Engagement during the monkeypox outbreak in Europe, 2022

Joint report by WHO Regional office for Europe/ECDC

2 June 2022

Introduction

Recent health emergencies in the European Region have highlighted Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) as core public health intervention which contributes to emergency response. Risk Communication and Community Engagement is a key measure available to health authorities to enable at-risk or affected communities to take informed decisions to protect their health, particularly when there is no vaccine and little in the way of treatment available. As such, RCCE is instrumental to achieve results across all the main areas of the response, from laboratory testing, contact tracing and isolation, to treatment and preventative and protective measures. For all these measures, support from affected communities is crucial for their success.

Scope and audience

This document is intended for health authorities working on RCCE in the context of the current monkeypox outbreak in Europe. It provides advice on approaches to the communication of risks and engagement of population groups based on the outbreak's epidemiology and context, recommended preventive measures and people's perceptions and behaviour.

The complexities of the monkeypox outbreak and context in Europe call for a comprehensive response that integrates risk communication with community engagement strategies to engage diverse audiences based on their risk of exposure. This mostly points at ensuring timely and consistent health information and advice to broader populations, while using more direct channels and engagement to those at increased risk through two-way communication.



monkeypox outbreak in Europe, 2022

Stockholm, 30 June 2022 Introduction

Recent health emergencies in the European Region, such as the COVID-19 pandemic and the multi-country monkeypox outbreak, have reaffirmed the role of Risk Communication and Community Engagement (RCCE) as a core public health intervention contributing to emergency response. RCCE is instrumental in achieving results across all the main areas of response, from laboratory testing, contact tracing and isolation, to treatment and preventive/protective measures, including vaccination. For all of these measures, successful implementation is dependent on support from affected individuals and communities.

This document is intended for health authorities designing RCCE interventions in the context of the current nonkeypox outherak in Europe. It supplements the 'Interim advice on Risk Communication and Community Engagement during the monkeypox outbreak in Europe, 2022 [1] pintly published by ECDC and the World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe. It provides examples and approaches for RCCE, while building on experience from past outbreaks. These examples can be used to inspire countries in the European Region to develop community engagement approaches and risk communication strategies adapted to the national, regional and/or local context and specific target audiences in their response to the ongoing monkeypox outbreak.

General considerations

Anyone can become infected with monkeypox, but the current outbreak in Europe is affecting agy, bisexual and other men who have see with men (MSM) disproportionately. Health authorities therefore need to make a particular effort to ensure their RCCE is reaching MSM, and that they consider the messages to be non-stigmatising, credible and actionable. Collaboration with civil society organisations active in these community groups and with organisers of events that the groups are likely to attend (e.g. Pride events) is an effective way to achieve this:

RCCE interventions may be developed and carried out by different stakeholders including public health authorities, civil society organisations and other non-governmental organisation (NGOs), academic institutions and event organisers. When public health authorities are designing such interventions, it is of the utmost importance that representatives of the community, such as civil society organisations, are consulted during the development phase, including on the communication channels, the communicator and the messages most suitable for outreach to target audiences. The context they can provide on their communities—for



Interim advice for public health authorities on summer events during the monkeypox outbreak in Europe, 2022

Joint report by World Health Organization (WHO) Regional Office for Europe and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC)

14 June 202

Background

Since 13 May 2022, multiple cases of monkeypox have been reported by Member States of the WHO European Region that are not endemic for monkeypox views, including countries of the European Wisnorpiuspean Economic Area (EUEEA) and beyond [1,3]. These recently disposed monkeypox cases have been identified primarily but not exclusively among term who have ser with mem (1954). Human-to-human transmission of monkeypox occurs through coles contact with infectious material from sion lesions of an infected person, through residently disposed propriets and propriets of the characteristic and through for sion lesions of an infected person, through residently and propriets from the characteristic and through for misses (e.g. linems, bedding, sex toys, collimps) (223).


As the pandemic restrictions related to international based and mass gatherings have been lifted in many European countries, a large number of mass gatherings including music, culture feathwisk or Pride events are glanned, that will bring together young, international participants during the summer months. In addition, party events and other spontaneous gatherings are likely to take place in touristic settings (e.g., hotel/basch parties, etc.) during the

Large gatherings may represent a conductive environment for the binamission of the monkeypox visus if they entail close, prointing and refrequent retractions among people, in particular sexual activity. Moreover, in record veans, outtreaks of other infectious diseases, including among 1959 f.e.g. hepatitis A, meningtals, can be inked to threw alread and social and mass significant environments. Theorem, insensity in monotoness produced through social and issual networks have shown that carecting organized gatherings is thely to be counterproductive to deside and sexual networks have shown that carecting organized gatherings is thely to be counterproductive to deside in other settings, actually provided to the settings, and the second second

Aim

The aim of this document is to provide concise advice to public health authorities and guide their prevention, wavenesses resisting and behaviour change interventions before, during and after spooring summer events. This was enable them to make the opportunities for disseminating reliable information, advice and practical guidance to participants and minimize the public health insist from condexpoor. Although the main focus is mortispoor in control participants and in minimize the public reliable insistence of the devices debesses (e.g., 19%, seasily transmission of a number of infections debesses (e.g., 19%, seasily transmission and in summer of the control of the con





people have been hospitalised due to their monkeypox symptoms or subsequent skin infections


seek medical advice by contacting your local health provider or sexual health clinic;

Monkeypox is not a 'gay disease' and gay men are not to be blamed or shamed for the outbreak. Stigma is counterproductive. Monkeypox is nothing to be ashamed of and is not associated with a specific sexual orientation. Do not let stigma prevent you from accessing the healthcare you need. You can help by combatting stigma, sharing information, paying attention to symptoms, and if diagnosed, by following the recommendations of your healthcare provider (e.g. by self-isolating and helping health authorities to notify close contacts).

take a break from visiting gatherings, venues or events and avoid having close contact, including sex, until you have sought the advice of a health provider and know that you are well.

If you have any of the above symptoms:

Gay sex stigma and monkeypox







Tool Kit for Event Organisers



Working with community groups, event organizers, ECDC and WHO launched guidance and ready-to-use materials to enable event organizers to deliver accurate and timely messaging, **before**, **during and after** an event:

1. The role of organisers have in prevention of MPX

The steps they can take to strengthen prevention

- Messages to share with participants, before, during and after the event
- Questions and Answers on symptoms, transmission and protective

Key messages

Community actors to be engaged

• Tips on mapping Civil Society Organizations & other community actors

The resources you can consult

- Multimedia
- Images
- Sound bites
- Video clips

Conclusions I



- Cases of mpox has been reported sporadically in 2023, with just one outbreak in France
- Mpox is not longer considered a PHEIC as the long-term challenges would be better addressed through sustained efforts in a transition towards a long-term strategy.
- Those vaccinated should continue to avoid close contact with people who have mpox, and testing should be available for those exposed despite vaccination scheme.
- The limited evidence available indicates that the vaccine provides protection against MPXV.
- The evidence indicates that two doses provide the highest vaccine effectiveness and therefore vaccination with two doses should be considered for all eligible individuals.

Conclusions II



- RCCE is a key element in public health preparedness and response. Although risk communication is necessary, it is not sufficient. Finding ways to engage with at-risk groups, including community-based organisations and civil society is key
- Quick integration of RCCE and collaboration with regional and local actors was positive
- Moving forward there is a need to assess the value and impact of the RCCE activities and outputs for MS
- Integrate mpox detection, prevention, care and research with existing and innovative HIV and sexually transmitted disease prevention and control programmes, and other health services as appropriate.

Thanks to the mpox team and consulted experts



This report of the European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control (ECDC) was coordinated by Daniel Cauchi and Joana Haussig and was written by the following ECDC experts (in alphabetical order): Luis Alves de Sousa, Agoritsa Baka, Daniel Cauchi, Orlando Cenciarelli, Silvia Funke, Joana Haussig, Nina Lagerqvist, Lina Nerlander, Juliana Reyes, Frank Sandmann, Theodora Stavrou.

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Germany: Klaus Jansen (Robert Koch Institute, RKI).

Portugal: Paula Vasconcelos (Direção-Geral da Saúde – Ministry of Health).

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Lina Nerlander



Thank you!